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ABSTRACT
Since the 2000s, the proliferation of Global Health Initiatives such as the Global Fund have
dramatically changed the field of global health. The European Union and several of its Member
States have played an important role in the development of the Global Fund and have
contributed considerable budgets to it. While the Fund has been successful in fighting priority
diseases, it has also been criticized for impacting negatively on countries’ health systems, which
provoked a debate on health system strengthening (HSS) within the organization. Drawing on a
literature review, aid statistics, interviews at headquarter and field level, and document analysis,
this article researches the relation between EU donors and the Global Fund, with an explicit focus
on the HSS debate. The findings indicate a ‘love-hate relationship’. EU donors have loved the
Global Fund’s innovative institutional set-up and its ‘saving lives’ approach involving quick results.
However, over the years they have become more critical about its narrow focus, advocating a shift
towards more HSS. Whereas this has been partly successful at headquarters level, most notably the
incorporation of concrete HSS commitments in the Global Fund’s strategic documents, challenges
at local level constrain their translation into funding and implementation measures.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) and its Member States (hereafter
‘EU donors’) provided 25.5% of all Development Assist-
ance for health (DAH) in the period 2002–2016 (IHME
2018). In addition to aid through bilateral programs of
Member States, the European Commission and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), a considerable part
of European DAH is channeled through multilateral
funding. In the past, the major health-related multilateral
organizations were the World Health Organization, UN
Agencies, like UNICEF and UNFPA, and the World Bank.
However, since 2000, the proliferation of so-called
Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) has dramatically changed
the global health scene. These initiatives focus on
disease-specific interventions and are funded and gov-
erned by multiple public and private entities. One of the
most important GHIs is the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria (hereafter ‘the Global Fund’ or
‘Fund’), which was launched in 2002.
At the beginning of the 2000s, the launch and success
of Global Health Initiatives such as the Global Fund drew
renewed attention for the longstanding debate on
vertical (disease-specific) versus horizontal (overall
strengthening of health systems) approaches within
international health assistance (Mills 2005). The vertical
approach implies that most funding and attention goes
to disease-specific interventions. This often involves
setting up parallel structures that focus on that disease,
by using ‘planning, staffing, management, and
financing systems that are separate from other services’
(Travis et al. 2004, 901). The advantage of this approach
is that it delivers quick, visible and measurable results.
Within the horizontal approach, the focus lies on
strengthening basic health care needs and the wider
health system. Here, the idea is to ‘work through existing
health-system structures’ (Ibid.) and to strengthen them.
This is claimed to be more sustainable in the long term,
although results are less easy to measure.
While the Global Fund has been effective in fighting
disease, its focus has also come under scrutiny. Critics
stressed the unintended negative consequences of the
GHIs on the health systems of poor countries (Garrett
2007; Lancet Infectious Diseases 2007; Biesma et al. 2009).
This has led to renewed attention to HSS (Hafner and
Shiffman 2013) and specifically also to a debate within the
Global Fund on the extent to which it should focus on HSS.
This article explores the relationship between the EU
donors and the Global Fund with an explicit focus on
the debate on Health System Strengthening (HSS). The
Global Fund has transformed the way (European)
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donor assistance for health is channeled to developing
countries (Brugha 2005). The EU and several of its
Member States have played an important role in the
Fund’s development and have contributed considerable
budgets to it. Of all the multilateral organizations, the
Global Fund received the most DAH from EU donors:
between 2002 and 2016, 48% of all European DAH has
been transferred through multilateral organizations, of
which 30% went to the Global Fund (IHME 2018).
At the same time, however, EU donors tend to incor-
porate HSS as a priority in their policy strategies on
health and development (Belgian Directorate General
for Development and Be-cause Health Platform 2008;
Danida 2009; Council of the European Union 2010; Euro-
pean Commission 2010; HM Government 2011; Ministère
des Affaires Etrangères et de Développement Inter-
national 2017). The conclusions of the Council of Minis-
ters about the ‘EU role in global health’ even explicitly
state that EU donors should ‘act together in all relevant
internal and external policies and actions by prioritizing
their support on strengthening comprehensive health
systems in partner countries’ (Council of the European
Union 2010, 2)
European pleas for HSS seem to contradict their major
role in the Global Fund, as the latter has a disease-
specific approach and its efforts on HSS have been
limited. This ambiguity in the European approach
towards the Fund constitutes the main puzzle addressed
in this article. Rollet and Amaya (2015) touch upon this
ambiguity, stating that ‘the EU’s progressive move to
such an [horizontal] approach could have jeopardized
its engagement with the Global Fund’ (p.12). They
suggest a potential explanation, by anticipating a ‘pro-
gressive move’ of the Global Fund towards HSS, which
could strengthen the coherence of the EU’s policy and
the interaction between both organizations. However,
the authors have not elaborated on this and the sugges-
tion of an EU ‘progressive move’ within the Global Fund
has not been substantiated. While considerable research
has been done on the Global Fund, research into its
relation with the EU, and specifically the question of hor-
izontality versus verticality, has been scarce. In this
article, we aim to take the debate one step further by
examining more systematically and empirically the
relation between the EU and the Global Fund, and
specifically the question on the ‘progressive move’
towards the ‘horizontalization’ of the Fund.
Methods
Given the near-absence of literature on this topic, we
have opted for an abductive research approach. Abduc-
tion stems from the pragmatist research tradition, which
advocates problem-driven and complexity-sensitive
research (Cornut 2009). Abduction reasons at an inter-
mediate level between deduction (where a framework
is imposed) and induction (where findings build on
empirics) (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). It involves a
continuous interaction between theory and empirics,
whereby literature review, data generation, data analysis
and research design mutually influence each other in a
cyclical research process. Abductive research often
starts from an empirical puzzle. In this case the research
builds on puzzling observations during the lead author’s
field research for a broader study on EU donors’
approaches on international health assistance, where
interviewees at European agencies complained about
the negative effects of the Global Fund on countries’
health systems. As EU donors themselves contribute sig-
nificantly to the Global Fund, we wanted to better under-
stand this relation.
This research process involved several methods that
were used during two phases. During a first, explorative
phase, interviews were conducted with 31 donor repre-
sentatives: three at headquarters level (March–April
2015 and December 2016) and 28 at local level of which
eight were in the DRC (November 2015, December 2016
& February–April 2017), seven in Ethiopia (December
2015), seven in Uganda (February–March 2017) and six
in Mozambique (March–April 2017). The local level con-
cerns four Sub-Saharan African countries that are relevant
because the discussion on HSS is highly prominent in
these countries, given the fragile nature of their public
health system and their high dependency on aid for
health financing. Also, a significant number of EU
donors are heavily involved in the health sector in these
countries. Most interviewees were EU and MS officials,
and three were officials from non-EU donor countries1.
These explorative interviews were recorded and fully
transcribed.
In a second phase, additional and more specific infor-
mation was gathered on the EU donors’ relationship with
the Global Fund. We decided to mainly focus on the
European Commission, the UK, France, Germany,
Denmark and Belgium, not only for reasons of feasibility
but also because these include the biggest European
contributors to the Global Fund (infra Figure 3) and
also some smaller donors which from the exploratory
phase appeared to have a clear vision on health assist-
ance. Together, these six donors cover all the five Euro-
pean constituencies within the Global Fund.2
This phase involved several methods. A literature
review was conducted to better understand the launch
and development of the Global Fund and the debate
on HSS within it. Furthermore, we made a descriptive
statistical analysis of DAH by the EU donors and the
S2 L. STEURS ET AL.
Global Fund, based on data from the Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). To analyze EU donors’ role
in the HSS debate, we conducted a document-analysis of
relevant policy and background papers of the selected
EU donors and the Global Fund. Lastly, additional semi-
structured interviews were conducted in May-June
2017 with eight people at headquarters level3. Again,
interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Intervie-
wees generally express the views of their employer,
although their evaluations are sometimes more explicit
and less diplomatic than in official documents.
Based on the empirical information gathered during
these two phases, several themes were identified that
express certain arguments about the European engage-
ment with the Global Fund. These smaller themes were
then grouped into bigger themes, such as ‘reasons to
fund the Global Fund’, ‘discussions on HSS at headquar-
ters level’, ‘perceptions of Global Fund and HSS at
country level’. This initial analysis was done through a
close reading by the lead author, while the empirical
data and the resulting findings were extensively dis-
cussed, refined and elaborated with the co-authors. Sub-
sequently, these findings were presented at two
international conferences involving experts in EU devel-
opment and Global Health policy respectively, and the
article was finalized taking into account relevant peer
feedback.
The remains of this paper are organized as follows.
First, we elaborate on the HSS debate within the Global
Fund. Thereafter, we focus on the relationship between
EU donors and the Global Fund, claiming that EU
donors have been attracted by the Fund’s innovative
institutional set-up and its ‘saving lives’ approach, but
that over the years they have become more critical
about its vertical approach and have attempted to ‘hor-
izontalize’ the Fund. The third part discusses some
remaining challenges, including limited implementation
and limited European coordination. Finally, we summar-
ize and discuss the main findings.
The HSS debate in the Global Fund
As mentioned above, there has been a longstanding but
unresolved debate in international health between hori-
zontal and vertical approaches. In response to the tech-
nical, vertical programs in the 1960s and 1970s, the
WHO’s Alma Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care of
1978 articulated the need to focus on basic healthcare
systems to reach ‘health for all’ by 2000 (World Health
Organization 1978). This comprehensive primary health-
care approach was quickly criticized for being too
broad and idealistic and was replaced by a focus on selec-
tive primary health care, involving a limited number of
cost-effective interventions (Cueto 2004). During the
1990s, the switch from earmarked project funding to
supporting the whole health sector through Sector
Wide Approaches (SWAps) marked a new shift towards
horizontality. Around 2000 however, the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic and the launch of GHIs made the pendulum
swing back to vertical programs.
The Global Fund, launched in the light of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, has been the most successful GHI. With the
availability of antiretroviral therapies since 1996, HIV/
AIDS became a treatable disease in North America and
Europe, bringing an end to ‘AIDS exceptionalism’ in the
West. However, as antiretrovirals were not affordable in
developing countries, the case for exceptionalism shifted
to the international stage (Smith and Whiteside 2010).
Advocacy groups and CSOs profoundly influenced the
international mobilization for the epidemic, stressing the
human rights of affected people (De Cock, Jaffe, and
Curran 2011; Smith 2017). In addition, the securitization
of HIV/AIDS as a global threat also increased attention
to the epidemic (Smith and Whiteside 2010). All this
created a favorable context in which Western politicians
wanted to make antiretrovirals available for all, which
entailed the launch of the Global Fund in 2002. While
the fund originated in the context of AIDS exceptionalism,
it was decided to focus on malaria and TB as well.
As the Global Fund became an influential organization
over the years, some unanticipated adverse side effects
on countries’ health systems became apparent. Several
authors claimed that the GHIs had negative conse-
quences on poor countries’ health systems, by fragment-
ing their health systems and distorting their national
health policies (e.g. Garrett 2007; Lancet Infectious Dis-
eases 2007; Biesma et al. 2009). A few years after their
launch, proponents of HSS thus started to argue that
GHIs have picked the ‘low hanging fruit’ and that their
focus should be extended towards strengthening the
broader health system (Hill et al. 2011). Although it has
been recognized that in some cases the Global Fund’s
vertical approach can have positive spillover effects on
the wider health system (Atun et al. 2011; Rasschaert
et al. 2011), several studies find that the overall impact
on the wider health system has been limited or even
negative (Biesma et al. 2009; Marchal, Cavalli, and
Kegels 2009; WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Colla-
borative Group 2009). Whatever the outcome of this
(yet unresolved) debate may be, our point in this
article is not to provide evidence for the extent to
which the Global Fund might have strengthened or wea-
kened recipient countries’ health systems, but rather to
understand how EU donors deal with the common criti-
cism that the Global Fund’s vertical approach is detri-
mental for HSS.
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In reaction to the critiques, and following the
example of the Vaccines Alliance GAVI, Round 5 of the
Global Fund (in 2005) included for the first time a
specific category for HSS. However, there was a lot of
debate on this within the Global Fund Board. For
opponents of HSS, the allocations towards HSS went
too far, while proponents of HSS claimed that the
‘health system activities’ contributed only to specific
programs, rather than strengthening the system as a
whole (Hill et al. 2011). Only three out of 30 HSS appli-
cations were approved and according to the Technical
Review Panel, there was insufficient clarity and gui-
dance about the development and evaluation of HSS
proposals (McCoy et al. 2012). At the same time, other
actors influenced the debate as well. At the request of
the World Bank, a comparative study of the Global
Fund and the World Bank AIDS programs was con-
ducted, which argued that both organizations should
focus on their comparative advantages, recommending
that the Global Fund focus on disease-specific interven-
tions, leaving HSS interventions to the World Bank
(Shakow 2006). Despite CSOs urging to keep HSS inter-
ventions as a specific category, the separate channel for
HSS funding disappeared again in 2006 (Ooms, Van
Damme, and Temmerman 2007; Hill et al. 2011).
However, the topic remained on the agenda and sug-
gestions were tabled to transform the Global Fund to
fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria into a Global Health
Fund (Ooms et al. 2008; Cometto et al. 2009). In 2009,
plans were made to set up a Health System Funding
platform between the Global Fund, GAVI and the
World Bank ‘to coordinate, mobilize, streamline and
channel the flow of existing and new international
resources to support national health strategies’ (Hill
et al. 2011, 1). This plan faced significant opposition as
well and in the end the platform was never
implemented. According to McCoy et al. (2012), this
failure was also due to the global financial crisis and
‘skepticism about the credibility of HSS strategies, inter-
ventions and measurements of progress’ (p.11).
Over the years, there has thus been a constant
struggle within the Global Fund on the issue of HSS.
This has gradually entailed more attention for this
issue. However, despite a number of steps to slowly
‘de-verticalize’ its structure and activities, HSS mostly
remained a secondary concern for the Fund during the
first decade of the 2000s, due to internal opposition as
well as opposition from other organizations (McCoy
et al. 2012). Several authors have claimed that GHIs like
the Global Fund interpret HSS in a narrow, instrumental
way, using well-targeted and specific interventions with
clear, measurable outcomes (Marchal, Cavalli, and
Kegels 2009; van Olmen et al. 2012; Storeng 2014). This
is in strong contrast to a broader conceptualization of
HSS focusing on social, societal and political dimensions
(van Olmen et al. 2012).
The limited progress on HSS is also apparent from the
aid budgets. Based on the IHME database we calculated
the Fund’s contribution to HSS. The DAH for HSS in this
database falls into two categories (IHME 2017). First,
sector-wide support (HSS/SWAP) that goes into a
pooled fund for the health sector and includes non-ear-
marked funds that contribute to the broad national
health sector such as improving monitoring and evalu-
ation of a health issue or better coordination among all
stakeholders. Second, aid that improves the health
system but is nevertheless targeted towards specific
health-focused areas such as HIV/AIDS or maternal,
newborn, and child health. The latter could be named
health system support, which should be distinguished
from health system strengthening as it concerns less
comprehensive changes to the health system and all
its building blocks (Chee et al. 2013).
From these data, it appears that in 2016 only 2% of
DAH of the Global Fund went to HSS/SWAP (IHME
2018). Although the Fund contributes an important
share of its budget to health systems support (20%), its
relative importance has not changed over the years (it
was already 23% in 2003 and has remained stable
since then).
More recently, however, the Global Fund made more
substantive strategic changes. In 2012, a new funding
model was introduced, which would align better to
the needs, plans and processes of the partner countries
compared to the previous round-based model. While
the new funding model led to an increase in funding
requests and approvals for HSS programs, there were
nevertheless remaining challenges at country level,
due to the lack of operational support mechanisms
and processes (Abejero 2015). The Ebola outbreak in
West Africa in 2014–2016 created a window of opportu-
nity for the horizontalization of the Global Fund, as it
clearly demonstrated that strengthening health
systems is necessary for future epidemic preparedness.
Consequently, there was more attention for HSS in the
discussions on the Global Fund’s new strategy for
2017–2022. In response to the challenges raised con-
cerning HSS in the New Funding Model, the Technical
Evaluation Reference Group (TERG) of the Global Fund
commissioned the Danish-based consultancy company
Euro Health Group for a thematic review of HSS
(Abejero 2015). Building on this review and other
inputs, the TERG developed recommendations towards
the Global Fund. These were taken into account in the
new strategy, which arguably meant a big leap
forward towards HSS (Abejero 2016).
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EU donors and the Global Fund
EU donors have played an important role in the develop-
ment of the Global Fund and have contributed consider-
able budgets to it. Interestingly, this seems to contradict
European pleas for HSS, as the Global Fund has a
disease-specific approach and its efforts on HSS have
been limited. In this part, we aim to understand this
puzzle by pointing at two main aspects. Firstly, we claim
that EU donors have been attracted by the Fund’s innova-
tive institutional set-up and its ‘saving lives’ approach,
through which quick results could be attained in the
fight against HIV/AIDS. Secondly however, Eu donors
have attempted to ‘horizontalize’ the Fund, by making
their voice heard in the HSS debate in the Global Fund
outlined above.
The attractiveness of the Global Fund
As mentioned above, both the successful activism on
HIV/AIDS and the language of securitization and globali-
zation created a favorable political environment in which
Western politicians wanted to make antiretrovirals avail-
able for all. EU donors wanted to take the lead in this but
realized that this required a huge scale-up of resources
which would not be possible through bilateral efforts
only (interviews HQ 4, 8 & 10). Consequently, they
wanted to create an international dynamic that also
incorporated important non-European partners such as
the US and the private sector.
In a context of growing critique on the effectiveness of
aid and on ‘traditional’ development aid through bilateral
and UN agencies, as well as the credibility problems that
had plagued the WHO, the Global Fund appeared to be
an attractive and innovative alternative. Itsmodel was con-
sidered to be concrete and ambitious. Therewas the inten-
tion to ‘not (do) business as usual, i.e. to be a quicker
financing mechanism than the traditional bilateral and
multilateral donor agencies’ (Brugha 2005). In line with
the increased trend of using cost-effectiveness analysis as
a basis for international health priority-setting, it adopted
a performance-based funding model (McCoy et al. 2012).
Furthermore, it was considered to be less bureaucratic
than UN organizations, given its ‘light-touch’ it does not
have in-country offices (Brugha and Walt 2001; interviews
HQ 6 & 10). Instead, local Country Coordination Mechan-
isms (CCMs) - consisting of representatives from govern-
ment, the private sector, donor agencies, civil society and
communities living with HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria - were
developed to identify, manage and evaluate the priorities
and funding needs. The Global Fund was also lauded for
its inclusiveness, given the structured participation of civil
society and the involvement of the private sector both in
the amongst its board members and in the CCMs (inter-
views HQ 7, 10 &11).
This innovative funding model proved to be success-
ful: given its specific focus, the Fund succeeded in
achieving quick results. Donors also welcomed the
public visibility of the organization (Brugha 2005; inter-
views HQ 7 & 11). The Global Fund secretariat has been
very successful in demonstrating its impact by calculat-
ing for example how many lives are saved. As mentioned
by one respondent, they are ‘highly skilled marketeers’
(HQ 6). This ‘saving lives’ approach has made it even
more attractive for donors to continue investing in the
organization, as they can easily get ‘value for money’
and the results can easily be communicated as successes
to the general public. The transparency of the Global
Fund has also been considered a great asset, including
the set-up of the Office of the Inspector General, an inde-
pendent control instance (Brugha 2005, interviews HQ 7
&11). More recently, the Global Fund has started to work
a lot on scaling-up domestic resources in partner
countries, which is supported as well by the European
partners (interviews HQ 9 &11). All these factors contrib-
uted to the success story of the Global Fund, which
became far more popular than the World Health Organ-
ization. Arguably, the latter has struggled for decades to
convince its member states of its effectiveness and its
reputation deteriorated further after its slow response
to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014–2016.
Being such an attractive organization, EU donors have
channeled a considerable part of their DAH through the
Global Fund. Figure 1 shows the distribution of multilat-
eral DAH. In total, 30% of all European multilateral DAH4,5
has been channeled through the Global Fund, which
makes it by far the biggest multilateral channel for EU
donors. Germany and France have even contributed
respectively 53.3% and 38.2% of all their multilateral
DAH through the Global Fund. Remarkably, the WHO
has only received 15% of multilateral DAH, as 10 EU
donors have provided more money to the Global Fund
than to the World Health Organization.
Given their considerable contributions, the EU and EU
Member States have been responsible for 41.1% of all
DAH channeled through the Global Fund over the
period 2002–2016 (Figure 2). Figure 3 shows the top 15
donors who have contributed the most DAH through
the Global Fund between 2002–2016, including nine
EU Member States.
Increasing critique on the vertical stance of the
Global Fund
Already at the start of the Global Fund, there were
varying positions among the board members on HSS.
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While most of the EU donors supported HSS in their bilat-
eral programs by promoting the SWAPs since the mid-
1990s, HSS was less of a priority for the United States
and the private sector. However, these tensions did not
seem to be problematic at that time, as the Global
Fund funding was meant to be ‘additional’ and ‘comp-
lementary’ to existing aid from multilateral and bilateral
agencies (Brugha and Walt 2001; interview HQ 10 &
11). Consequently, HSS could still be a priority of EU
donors through their bilateral support.
However, as theGlobal Fundbecame such an influential
organization, these tensions soon became more proble-
matic. Already in 2005, research by Brugha et al. (2004)
briefly described how several country representatives
working for EU donors were critical about the Global
Fund. As they themselves were supporting the SWAPs,
they claimed that the Fund was ‘reverticalising health
systems and forcing a disease-specific approach’ (p. 97).
This critique is still present, as became apparent during
our field research in the DRC, Uganda, Mozambique and
Ethiopia. Several interviewees working for European
agencies expressed frustrations about the Global Fund’s
negative impact on countries’health systems. As illustrated
in the quotes below, some explicitly stated that the Global
Fund has been undermining or even ‘destroying’ the
efforts of EU donors on HSS. Consequently, they also criti-
cized the incoherence of their headquarters by supporting
HSS in bilateral programs and at the same time funding an
organization that is undermining it.
What is a tragedy is that many of the same EU donors that
are saying this is unacceptable are also funders to the
Global Fund that actually undermines what we are doing.
(MOZ 3).
[And we should] be able to say to the Global Fund, well,
we give you money, but this destroys what we have
done in our programme here in Congo. We should be
coherent. (DRC 7)
Figure 1. Multilateral DAH per Channel. Data from IHME 2018.
Figure 2. DAH distributed through the Global Fund 2002–2016.
Data from IHME 2018.
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While originating at country level, these critiques have
also reached the headquarters. EU donors have increas-
ingly criticized the vertical approach of the Global Fund
and made it a priority to reform it from within by
trying to ‘horizontalize’ it. Several relevant policy docu-
ments emphasize the objective to promote the HSS
approach within the Global Fund. The European Com-
mission stresses that ‘a comprehensive approach includ-
ing all priorities is the only efficient one’ and that ‘the EU
should promote this approach in global financing initiat-
ives such as the GFATM and the GAVI’ (European Com-
mission 2010). The Belgian strategy mentions that
although ‘the decision to support programmes which
combat specific diseases may be justified in certain
cases’, it is needed to take several principles into
account in supporting them, including ‘the level to
which these programmes offer a long term guarantee
that they reinforce the local healthcare system rather
than destabilise it’ (Belgian Directorate General for Devel-
opment and Be-cause Health Platform, 2008, 25–26).
Denmark underlines that it ‘supports some of the GHPs
but will condition its support on increasing adherence
to the Paris Declaration principles’ (Danida 2009, 19). In
their organizational strategy for the Global Fund 2014–
2017 they furthermore explicitly point out that they
‘would welcome a gradual development in the direction
of GFATM becoming a more general and less vertical
health development fund’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denmark 2014).
The topic of HSS and GHIs has also been the subject of
discussion at parliamentary level. In its resolution on
‘health care systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and global
health’, the European Parliament (2010) argues that a ‘ver-
tical approach can under no circumstances be a substitute
for a sustainable horizontal approach to basic health’. Fur-
thermore, the resolution urges the Commission ‘to sup-
plement its aid for vertical funds with recommendations
designed to encourage ‘diagonal’ measures to support
basic health care in the countries concerned’. The Inter-
national Development Committee of the UK House of
Commons (2014) states that ‘DFID’s main international
partners do not give the development of health systems
the same priority as DFID does’. As Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) increasingly relies on multi-
laterals, DFID was recommended to ‘conduct a detailed
assessment, by country, of the extent to which existing
funding arrangements enable its health systems strength-
ening objectives to be met’.
Also, most European respondents at headquarters-
level were very vocal on this objective, as can be illus-
trated with the following quotes.
The approach with these Global Health Initiatives is to
develop the health systems angle or format, or
mandate. Pushing and building coalitions in the Global
Fund, and GAVI, to do that. (HQ2)
But Germany also expects very strongly from the Global
Fund and GAVI that they are enhancing their contribution
Figure 3. Top 15 donors of the Global Fund 2002–2016. Data from IHME 2018.
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towards system strengthening. And this means that the
two organizations should find ways to target more of
the money they have into HSS work. But they should
also be careful about how they do their business. […] to
make sure that the way they operationalize the money
does not harm with regards to HSS. (HQ4)
European efforts to horizontalize the GF
As EU donors had a preference for more HSS, they have
tried to make use of their presence in the board of
members to influence the Global Fund’s strategies to
move more in this direction. When the new funding
model was discussed in 2011–2012, one of the priorities
of European partners was to make sure that the budget
would be better aligned with the national health strat-
egies and the planning cycles of partner countries
(The Federal Government of Germany 2013, 13; inter-
views HQ 1 & 3). These efforts paid off as the new
funding model is indeed based more on country
needs, plans and processes than the previous rounds-
based model.
Also during the discussions on the new strategy for
2017–2020, EU donors were among the main advocates
to urge the Global Fund to further refine its approach to
HSS. France and Germany were particularly vocal on this
issue. They published a non-paper claiming that compre-
hensive HSS should not be treated as a byproduct, but as
an integral part of the Global Fund’s strategy and activi-
ties (interviews HQ 3, 5 &7). These efforts proved to be
successful, as HSS for the first time has been elevated
to the level of a Global Fund strategic objective.
Although using different wording, ‘building resilient
and sustainable systems for all’ became one of the four
priorities in the strategy for 2017–2022 (The Global
Fund 2017c). The new strategy thus clearly reflected
the Global Fund’s evolving approach towards HSS
(Abejero 2016). According to several respondents, it
meant a big leap forward towards HSS (interviews HQ
4, 5, 8 & 9).
On top of advocating for more HSS at the board of
members level, another, more indirect way of influencing
the Global Fund’s HSS activities has been the German
and French specific Technical Assistance programs.
France developed the so-called 5% initiative, whereby
5% of total French contributions to the Fund is ear-
marked for projects in French-speaking African countries,
managed by French technical agencies. The reason
behind this initiative was the realization that French-
speaking countries often had difficulties with accessing
the funds of the Global Fund, not only because the
latter’s templates and log-frames are in English, but
also because they are ‘designed in a very American
way’ (interview DRC 4). The objective of the 5% initiative
is therefore to mobilize expertise from the French-speak-
ing world to ‘facilitate the implementation of grants,
support the definition of strategies in those countries
and promote good grant governance, with an overall
focus on capacity-building’ (5% Initiative n.d.). Very
often, the technical assistance is linked to HSS (interview
HQ 8, DRC 4). The German technical assistance program
is called BACKUP and has three components: support to
the CCM, support for risk and grant management and
support for HSS (GIZ n.d.). Through this program,
German technical assistance has been used to develop
funding requests, in which there is special attention for
HSS (interview HQ 4).
Continuing challenges at local level
Despite the above-mentioned efforts to focus more on
HSS, challenges remain, mainly at the local level. Firstly,
the implementation of the HSS commitments seems
limited. Secondly, European involvement and coordi-
nation on the follow-up of the Global Fund’s activities
at the local level has been limited.
Lip service versus implementation
Following the increased attention for HSS at strategic
level, one respondent rightly stated that ‘now the
devil really lies in the detail of the operationalization’
(interview HQ 4). Changes at the local level have contin-
ued to be difficult. The New Funding Mechanism that
was launched in 2012 resulted in a significant increase
in funding requests and approvals for cross-cutting
HSS programming. However, as became clear in the
reviews of the concept notes by the Technical Review
Panel, there was a large variety in the quality of HSS pro-
posals and there were challenges ‘specifically with
respect to ensuring that the necessary support mechan-
isms and processes are operational at the country level’
(Abejero 2015). Consequently, there was a missed
opportunity in most countries to address wider health
system constraints.
This has been corroborated during our field work at
the country level, which revealed that there still is a per-
ception among several respondents that the HSS efforts
of the Global Fund remain lip service:
Even the Global Fund now has a special fund for
strengthening health systems, but if you see how the
money is utilized, it is just to strengthen the vertical pro-
grams, like malaria. (UG 4)
In the end it is also their own policy that they want to
align and harmonize, but in practice it is not so much.
(MOZ 1)
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The interviews were conducted in March-April 2017,
only shortly after the new strategy was launched.
Perhaps these perceptions might change following the
full implementation of the new strategy. Nonetheless,
while most interviewees at headquarters’ level were
positive about this strategy, some interviewees were
rather skeptical (interviews HQ 6,7 & 11). More specifi-
cally, they held a critical stance towards the Global
Fund’s preference for the term ‘RSSH’ instead of the
more commonly used ‘HSS’. As clarified in their docu-
ments, ‘systems for health, differently from health
systems, do not stop at a clinical facility but run deep
into communities and can reach those who do not
always go to health clinics, particularly the most vulner-
able and marginalized’ (The Global Fund 2017a, 4). The
Global Fund thus envisages to focus beyond the formal
health system (the Ministry of Health, subnational
bodies of governance and the clinical services), bringing
its products ‘to the last mile’ (interviews HQ 5 & 8). Some
interviewees claimed that the choice for this term once
again shows the Global Fund’s narrow, technical
interpretation of HSS, only focusing on the ‘hardware’
that is needed to bring the products to the last mile,
instead of a holistic approach towards the health
system (interviews HQ 6, 7 & 11). While stating that it
aims to work beyond the formal health system, there is
thus a risk that the Global Fund ignores the formal
health system.
Limited European involvement and coordination
at the local level
In case the EU donors want the Global Fund to walk the
talk about HSS, they will also have to follow up and
influence the activities of the Global Fund at local level.
Switzerland, France and Germany released a discussion
paper in November 2016, in which they recommended
a review of the role and functions of the CCM (The del-
egations of Switzerland, France and Germany 2017).
Among other things, they claim that country dialogues
should reach beyond disease-specific stakeholders and
that HSS experts should play a more prominent voice
in CCMs. They also see a role for themselves, claiming
that ‘Germany, Switzerland and France will promote
health systems strengthening through their bilateral pro-
grammes in-country, their direct involvement as CCM
members in certain countries and as Board members of
multilateral institutions’ (Delegations of Switzerland,
France and Germany 2017, 5).
However, our data signal mixed experiences with
regards to the local follow-up by and influence of EU
donors on the Global Fund. One way to influence the
Fund’s local activities is to have a seat at the CCM. The
specific set-up of the CCM differs in each country, but in
most countries, only one or two bilateral donors are rep-
resented within the platform. One of these seats usually
goes to the United States, who were present in 71 CCMs
in 2016 (The Global Fund 2017b). When it comes to the
EU donors, the French delegations are the most active,
as they were present in 30 CCMs. France has several
regional health cooperation counselors who are based
at the French embassies and have the specific task to
follow-up the multilateral funding for the country and
neighboring countries (interview HQ 8). The EU is also rela-
tively active with a seat in 16 CCMs. However, as can be
seen in the Table 1, other EU donors very often do not par-
ticipate in the CCMs. Donors such as Denmark and
Sweden were not present in any of the CCMs.
These numbers do not tell the whole story, as donors
could also be involved in discussions on the Global Fund
without having a seat in the CCM. This was for example
the case in the DRC, where the EU delegation has been
quite actively following the Fund’s activities (interviews
HQ 11, DRC 2 & 7). The delegation was concerned
Table 1. CCM presence. Data from The Global Fund 2017b.
Country
Presence in
CCM Presence as a Member Presence as an Alternate
Belgium 2 Burundi Rwanda
EU 16 Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Indonesia,
Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Philippines, Swaziland, Zimbabwe
Afghanistan
France 30 Albania, Armenia, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, CAR, Comoros, Chad, Congo, DRC, Côte
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, India, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, Togo, Senegal, South Africa, Vietnam
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Kenya, Zimbabwe
Germany 6 Cameroon, Togo, South Africa, Uzbekistan Niger, Malawi
Ireland 1 Uganda
Italy 1 Angola India




Spain 5 Equatorial Guinea, Philippines Mauritania, Morocco, Niger
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about the ‘destructive’ effects of the Global Fund supply
chain policies on the national system for the procure-
ment and distribution of medicines. They raised these
concerns with their colleagues in Brussels, who then
made it an issue of concern in Geneva, which led to a
profound debate on this topic. Furthermore, the
Belgian delegation in the DRC has made it a priority to
engage the Global Fund as much as possible in the
donor-wide coordination group in the health sector
(the GIBS; interview DRC 2). However, these seem to be
exceptions. Moreover, the examples of active involve-
ment without having a seat illustrate that much
depends on dedicated individuals who have a specific
commitment to this issue. The majority of local respon-
dents stated that it has been very challenging to
closely follow the activities of the Global Fund, simply
because of time constraints and lack of human resources
(interviews DRC 2, 3 & 6; MOZ 1,2,4 & 5; UG 1, 2, 3 & 5; ETH
1 & 2). Except for France, there seem to be few insti-
tutional incentives and expectations from headquarters
to be involved in Global Fund processes and/or to coor-
dinate for this purpose. As a result, the Fund does not
seem to be a priority within people’s busy schedules.
Several respondents agreed that EU donors’ influence
in the Global Funds’ decisions and activities at the local
level remains limited and needs to be strengthened, as
can be illustrated with the following quote.
I think we also have to become better in really engaging
in the CCM. And because only if we are there and if we
dedicate staff, resources and time to being really
engaged in CCM and country dialogues around the
Global Fund, we can make the change happen. (HQ 4)
Given the time constraints of individual donors to follow-
up on the GF, European coordination on the GHIs
becomes all the more important. While individual EU
donors might not participate in that many CCMs, EU
donors as a whole are still present in a large number of
CCMs (71 in 2016). At headquarters level, there have
been a number of initiatives to increase information
sharing and coordination on the Global Fund among
European partners. There are yearly thematic seminars
for EU delegations during which information is shared
on the GHIs (interview HQ 11). Furthermore, EU donors
at headquarters meet informally one or two weeks
before Global Fund board meetings, which allows for
problems at the local level to be brought up (interviews
HQ 6, 9 & 11). However, at the local level, European
coordination remains quite limited. In Ethiopia, joint
reporting on the achievements and challenges related
to Global Fund and GAVI funding was identified as a pri-
ority for EU Joint Cooperation in the health sector in 2014
(interviews ETH 2 & 7). In the three other countries where
we conducted field research, European coordination on
the Fund appeared very limited or even non-existent. It
remains to be researched as to what extent active and
effective European coordination of the Global Fund is
taking place in other Sub-Saharan African countries.
However, from our interviews we have not received indi-
cations that this would be the case.
Conclusion and discussion
This article has focused on the relation between EU
donors and the Global Fund, with a specific focus on
the debate on HSS, illustrating the ‘love-hate relation-
ship’ between both actors. On the one hand, EU
donors have always loved the Global Fund, as they
prefer the innovative, institutional set-up of the organiz-
ation as well as their ‘saving lives’ approach that gener-
ates quick results. However, over the years EU donors
have become more critical about the Fund’s narrow
focus, which is why they started advocating for a pro-
gressive shift towards more HSS. This had led to some
successes at headquarters’ level, resulting in clear com-
mitments towards HSS in the Global Fund’s strategic
documents. We have shown how EU donors struggle
because of the tension between the attractiveness of
the Global Fund’s bias towards ‘verticalism’ and the (per-
ceived) need of a more horizontal approach.
This article aimed to understand this ambiguity. In
essence, the key tension is that ‘horizontalizing’ the
Fund remains challenging, because the ‘specificities’
that make the Global Fund so successful and attractive,
are precisely those that also impede moves towards
HSS. First, the inclusive partnership model of the Fund
has been lauded because it brought together a large
variety of actors to fight together against infectious dis-
eases. However, since the Fund’s establishment it has
been clear that this partnership of multiple stakeholders
with different agendas and priorities embodies internal
dissonance and ambiguity around issues such as HSS
(McCoy et al. 2012). Over the years, progress on this
domain has been hampered partially because important
board members – mainly the US and the private sector -
were not that much involved in HSS. Second, the ‘saving
lives’ and ‘value for money’ approaches certainly contrib-
uted to the success story of the Global Fund. However, as
raised already by McCoy et al. (2013), ‘quantifying the
saving of lives’ could lead to a narrow focus on selected,
measurable interventions, undermining investment in
interventions that cannot easily be measured in terms
of saved lives, such as capacity building and institutional
development. As one of the respondents claimed, the
idea that one needs to strengthen national systems
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clashes with a quite dominant idea within the Global
Fund that ‘we have no time for that because we have
to save lives’ (interview HQ 11). Lastly, the ‘light’ structure
of the Global Fund, without in-country offices, is part of
its core identity (Brugha 2005). However, the absence
of in-country offices also has its downsides as it limits
participation in relevant forums such as health sector
planning meetings or donor coordination groups, and
hence limits knowledge of the local context.
As it is unlikely that these factors and tensions will
change, HSS seems a topic for ‘an ongoing and probably
endless debate’ (interview HQ 5). Nevertheless, EU
donors can still successfully influence this endless
debate, as became apparent in the discussions on the
new funding model and new strategy which made HSS
a more prominent priority. In order for this rhetorical
commitment to translate into concrete funding and
implementation, EU donors should also follow-up and
influence the Fund’s activities at the local level. For the
moment, this does not seem to be happening for most
EU donors as it depends on the commitment of individ-
uals. Neither is there significant and institutionalized
European coordination on this issue.
Although we have attempted to create a balanced
and comprehensive image of the role of EU donors in
the Global Fund and the debate on HSS within it,
based on a variety of empirical data sources, the
exploratory nature of this research means that we
could not elaborate on all aspects. While addressing
some limitations of this study, we therefore propose
some suggestions for future research. Firstly, the
image of an overarching vision on HSS among all EU
donors might have to be nuanced. While our data
clearly show a general preference for HSS among all
EU donors, which constitutes one of the major
findings of this article, it has also been suggested that
not all EU donors are as outspoken on this issue. For
instance, while Germany and France have recently
been very vocal on HSS, the UK appears to be less so
(partly because of its focus on ‘value-for-money’), and
some other Europeans might be situated somewhere
in between. This issue, which will become all the more
relevant in the context of Brexit, should be analyzed
more deeply in future research. Moreover, although
we have focused on the most relevant donors in
terms of vision and budget, further research could
analyze the remaining EU donors. Secondly, a closer
look at the domestic politics and institutions within
European donor countries may also reveal different
opinions on the Global Fund and HSS. For example,
interviewees with experience in countries with fragile
health systems seem to have more outspoken views
on these issues than those who have only worked at
headquarters level. How exactly divergent opinions
within countries synthesize into aggregate country pos-
itions is beyond the scope of this article. Further
research could therefore go beyond the general
finding of a European preference for HSS and how
this entails a love-and-hate relationship with the
Global Fund, and zoom in on more nuanced differences
between and within EU Member States.
Notes
1. The three HQ interviewees were representatives from the
EU and Belgium and an academic researcher. For the
partner countries, it concerned officials who are active
in the health sector. More specifically, for the DRC: repre-
sentatives from Belgium, the UK, France, the EU (two),
Sweden and USAID, as well as a former official of the
EU delegation in the DRC; for Uganda: representatives
from Sweden (two), Belgium (two), the Netherlands,
the UK and USAID; for Mozambique: the Netherlands,
Denmark, Sweden, the UK and Switzerland, and a
former official of the Danish delegation; for Ethiopia:
the EU (three), the Netherlands, the UK and Italy (two).
2. EU donors are represented at the Global Fund through
their presence in the board of members, which consists
of 28 constituencies: 10 donor constituencies, 10 imple-
menter constituencies and eight non-voting members.
The EU donors are spread among five constituencies: (1)
the European Commission, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, (2) France, (3) Germany, (4) the United Kingdom
and (5) the Point Seven constituency (Denmark, Norway,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden).
3. We interviewed six representatives of the selected EU
donors who are closely involved in their country’s
relations with the Global Fund (from Belgium (two), the
European Commission, France, Germany and Denmark),
in addition to a former European Commission official
and a staff member of the Global Fund secretariat. The
relevant department of DFID (UK) was not able to
accept my (repeated) requests for an interview. While
this is regrettable, information on the UK’s involvement
with the Global Fund could be found through other
documentation, including policy documents and exter-
nal perceptions.
4. The numbers only include the funding of 15 EU donors,
as the IHMI database does not provide separate data for
other EU donors. However, their contributions can be
considered negligible in relation to the total amount of
European DAH.
5. The European Commission is not considered to be a
source in the IHME database, but a channel. However,
in case a funding flow has two intermediary agencies,
only the ultimate agency is defined as the channel. Con-
sequently, it is not possible to track how much money
from European Member States is going to the Global
Fund via the European Commission.
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